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Abstract: Here we view naturalness from the point of view of proximate behavioural control.
The mechanisms of behaviour control have evolved in order that animals reach a specific goal
after they have performed motivated behaviour. This goal was closely related to a function at the
time when the mechanism evolved. Function and goal may be de-coupled in a novel environment
such as artificial housing conditions. We argue that an animal that can perform the behaviour it wants
and can reach the goals it likes can behave according to what is “in-its-nature” even under human
influenced conditions. We illustrate this argument using abnormal sucking behaviour in calves and
piglets as well as dehorning in cattle and goats. We conclude that a minimal welfare standard is
ensured for animals that are given the opportunity to behave as is in-their-nature.
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1. Naturalness, the Ethologist’s Perspective
Yeates recently defined naturalness in animals as a state in which humans have not interfered [1]
(p. 5, top). Though this definition may be correct from an etymological and philosophical standpoint,
it has limited use for the assessment of animal welfare [1]. In addition, it excludes humans from
being part of nature. It negates also recent ideas that see animals as much more active in their
(behavioural) choices. Animals may not be as passively subjected to the pressures of their environment
as has previously been thought [2]. Moreover, there are recent findings on the domestication process
indicating that species actively sought the closeness to humans and in that sense domesticated
themselves to some degree [3–5]. If that is the case, would we need to consider the behaviour
of these animals as unnatural from the point of contact with humans and as more unnatural than other
interactions they may have had with other (animal) species? Given these difficulties, we propose a
different view on naturalness that takes the view that animals actively shape their fate. Moreover,
this definition may be related more directly to the welfare of animals in the end. From an ethological
perspective, it is possible to define naturalness as behaviour that is “in-the-nature” of a given animal
subject. If a subject can perform this behaviour, some basic level of welfare is ensured, even in an
environment that may look quite different from the wild habitat.
How does the behaviour in-the-nature of a subject come into existence? Tinbergen [6] was the first
to note that there are different aspects that shape behaviour [7,8]. In an ultimate sense, each behaviour
has a function, and animals that reach this function more efficiently, or more effectively have a higher
evolutionary fitness. Evolutionary fitness is reflected by a larger number of offspring. These offspring
carry the genetic basis for the given behaviour. Some epigenetic effects transferred from the mother
may already modulate this basis. Starting from this (epi-)genetic foundation, a subject further develops
throughout its own ontogeny, which includes individually learning and dealing with the specific
environment that this subject encounters. Finally, an adult state is reached in which behaviour is
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controlled by a mature but still flexible proximate (neural) mechanism [9]. The ontogenetic process and
the resulting behavioural control mechanism are seen as part of the proximate questions in respect to
behaviour. Behavioural control ensures that the motivated and executed behaviour reaches (proximate)
goals, which are related but not necessarily identical to their function [9–11]. It is sufficient that the
goals were closely correlated with the function when the genetic basis of that behavioural process was
laid down at the time when the control mechanism evolved.
With animals in human care (farm, companion, laboratory, and zoo animals), natural selection
based on reaching the functions of behaviour no longer operates. Nevertheless, little seems to have
changed throughout the process of artificial selection with respect to the general organisation of
behaviour. In all domesticated species, the behavioural heritage of their wild ancestors remains largely
visible, though e.g., the species’ temperament has changed towards being more docile. For example,
in all species that have been kept again in feral conditions, the behaviour that was performed was
highly similar to that of their wild ancestors ([12]; pigs [13–16]; cattle [17,18]); chickens [19]. The genetic
basis of behaviour has been conserved and therefore seems to be highly inert. One potential reason
for this may be the complexity of the genetic basis of the behavioural control mechanisms or the
interaction of this basis with the environment during development. Behavioural control is the major
task that the brain executes, and with respect to the brain, novel theories suggest that the genetic
basis provides information on how to build a brain (process) instead of providing a detailed blueprint
for how the brain should be built (end product). As behavioural choice may even actively shape a
large part of a species’ niche, behaviour may persist if circumstances change (non-optimal behaviour)
even in wild populations [2]. This may not be surprising when animals are viewed as entities “for”
behaviour, i.e., beings that descend from ancestors that dealt reasonably well with their surroundings.
Animal affective states are considered highly relevant for animal welfare [20–22]. It is also highly
likely that they are involved in behavioural control in at least three ways [9]. They help a subject to
prioritise and select motivations and then execute what they “want”, they signal whether a goal state
has been reached (whether it is “liked”) and, in the form of a specific mood state, modulate these wants
and likes. In this sense, behavioural control is directly linked to affective states. These, in turn, are
prominent in shaping an animal’s emotional wellbeing.
With respect to naturalness from an ethological point of view, we could therefore say that a subject
behaves naturally (that is, according to what is in-its-nature) whenever it can perform the behaviour
that it wants (is motivated to perform) and can reach the corresponding goal states (it then likes what
it achieved with its behaviour [9,11]). A natural-looking environment is not the only environment
where an animal may follow its wants and reach its goals. If adequate stimuli are provided, even
an artificial-looking environment may allow an animal to act on its wants and reach the according
goal states (see Box 1, sucking behaviour). For example, given the right stimuli (such as feeder and
drinker position and part of the pen adjacent to unfamiliar pigs, and/or with a wet floor) and objects
(long-stemmed straw), pigs will separate an area for defaecation [23–25] and build a nest before
farrowing [26]. Both these behaviours are likely to enhance welfare, the former will keep the pigs
cleaner and the later will satisfy a strong inherent motivation. If the stimuli/objects are not provided
this will restrict the welfare of the pigs.
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Box 1. Sucking behaviour in calves.
Mammalian infants are highly motivated to perform sucking behaviour (Figure 1). In the wild, sucking the
udder of the dam and receiving milk is essential for survival. Is it possible to substitute the dam while allowing
for oral behaviour “in the nature of a milk-dependent mammal”? We want to discuss two situations concerning
farm animal species here. Dairy calves are usually separated from their dam right after birth, because the milk
of the dam is seen as too valuable to be fed to the calves. The calves are then kept either singly or in peer groups.
They are fed milk or milk replacer artificially, e.g., via an automatic milk feeder. This management practice often
leads to cross-sucking, a redirected, abnormal oral behaviour, where calves suck the scrotum, udder, ears or
snouts of peers. Offering large amounts of milk may reduce cross-sucking ([27,28], but see [29]), but providing
calves contact to either the dam [30,31] or a foster cow [32] eliminates cross-sucking. We found that calves did
not develop cross-sucking with only two times 15 min of daily contact [30].
For dairy calves, we can therefore conclude that a milk feeder ensures nutritional needs, but is not suitable in
terms of allowing the sucking behaviour in-the-nature of a calf. Hunger seems to play a major role in triggering
cross-sucking. Thus, allowing ad libitum milk may help to reach the goal of sucking at least to some extent.
Moreover, sucking milk from an udder of either the dam or a foster cow allows the calves to reach the goal of
this highly motivated behaviour fully. This goal is reached even if social contact time is limited to a minimum.
On the other hand, piglets are sometimes reared artificially when a sow gives birth to more piglets than she
can suckle. Here, the surplus piglets are removed from the sow after the colostral phase and kept in pens with
peers. In these pens, milk is provided in cups [33]. In such a system, piglets drink the milk without performing
nutritive sucking. Since milk is provided ad libitum, nutritional needs are met fully. Nevertheless, the majority of
such piglets develop belly-nosing, another redirected, abnormal oral behaviour. Providing piglets with dummies
that allow non-nutritive sucking could reduce but not prevent belly-nosing [34]. In contrast to cross-sucking in
calves, hunger thus seems to play only a minor role in belly-nosing of piglets. However, both cross-sucking and
belly-nosing can seemingly only be reduced by allowing them to (artificially) suck milk. Oral behaviour as it
is in-the-nature of a calf or a piglet involves sucking a “real” udder the characteristics of which cannot easily
be substituted.
Figure 1. Milk feeding in calves (a,b) and piglets (c,d), either from the udder (a,c) or artificially (b,d).
What a subject wants is the integrative result of internal and external stimuli and states as well as
their affective assessment. If internal aspects dominate, we may also speak of behavioural needs [35].
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Most wants will be influenced to some degree by both internal and external states. However, internal
states will be more important for some wants (e.g., hunger) than for others (e.g., predator avoidance),
where external stimuli become more important. If an animal can follow its wants and achieve the
corresponding goals, a large share of the emotional aspects of well-being is likely to be assured. It may
be necessary to differentiate between fleeting wants that may be irrelevant in the long-term (e.g.,
a pig trying to catch a mouse that happens to cross its pen) and persistent or recurring wants that
can only be satisfied by reaching a specific goal state (e.g., nest-building in pigs for which they are
willing to invest quite some effort). The latter wants can only properly be dealt with by reaching the
corresponding goal state, which then become necessary. Given this view that wants should be fulfilled
and goals liked, it may be difficult to provide an animal subject with continuous positive emotional
states. Where emotions occur in proximate control, they do not function to provide continuous positive
states. If that was the case, we would no longer want anything nor like what we reached. Therefore,
behaving according to a subject’s nature will provide a solid foundation for welfare and possibly the
best welfare we can get (for ourselves and the animals in our care).
2. Assessment of Naturalness
To quantifying naturalness, Yeates proposed to find a population unaffected by human beings that
is as similar as possible to the population for which naturalness is to be assessed [1]. He then suggests
that the population in question shows natural behaviour if their behaviour is within the range of what
can be observed in the unaffected counterpart. This process is prone to several difficulties. This would
imply that the unaffected population was observed in the broadest variability of circumstances possible
to ensure that all natural behaviour was covered. For example, feral populations of pigs would need
to be observed in woodlands, open shrub environments, mountainous planes, and possibly even on
Caribbean beaches. Still, one would never know if the chosen circumstances were broad enough
in order to ensure that everything else that might be observed in the affected population could be
considered “unnatural”. Moreover, according to this premise, naturalness can be accepted only
if a 1:1 snapshot of the unaffected population is shown by the affected population. In respect to
quantitative comparisons, Yeates remains rather vague in that no specific methods are proposed
regarding how any potential difference should be assessed or how cut-offs can be designed to separate
non-natural from natural behaviour. He suggests considering which behaviours occur for how long
and in which sequence. This spans a highly multi-dimensional space in which natural behaviour
is described. This may well reflect how behaviour is structured, but there may then easily be a
discrepancy between a human-influenced and a natural population in certain (few) dimensions,
for example, the human-influenced population may not differ in the ethogram (the behaviours that
occur) but the behavioural budget may be very different. How would one assess such a situation? In
the end, such a comparison would be very hard to evaluate given the different dimensions and levels
on which behaviour can be measured (and then compared).
In addition, such a view is inconsistent with the existing flexibility of behaviour (“phenotypic
plasticity”). For example, if, in human care, there is a behaviour to which an animal subject is no
longer motivated, such as predator avoidance, the subject is not directly affected by the absence of that
behaviour. Another such example is likely to concern sickness [11]. Although sickness behaviour can
be considered natural, a motivation for sickness behaviour is highly unlikely to be missed (“needed”) in
the absence of disease. Therefore, health as an important component of animal welfare does not oppose
natural behaviour in any way. It is also plausible that a goal may be more easily attained in human
care because the time constraints for different behaviours may be eased. In that case, a motivated
behaviour would only need to be shown for a much shorter time to reach the goal state. There may still
be an ethical question whether we should allow a specific behaviour to disappear in human care, but it
seems difficult to argue that a subject directly suffers by the absence of a want that never comes up.
Given this somewhat less rigid view on how behaviour must look in a population with human
contact, we would need to assess the wants and likes of an animal subject to assess whether it behaves
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according to what is in-its-nature. This is, admittedly, also no simple endeavour. For example, we may
only know about those wants that we investigate and for which we provide an opportunity [36].
If we do not ask the right questions, some wants may go unobserved. On the other hand, some
wants may only occur if we ask about them and might not occur at all if not asked about, such as
predator avoidance that may only occur if a predator or predator cues are encountered. In addition,
super-stimuli that have not or only rarely been encountered in the evolutionary past may not have
effective goal states (such as consuming sugar, the self-application of drugs, or wheel running in
rodents [36]). Whether such super-stimuli could even enhance welfare beyond the point as seen
under natural conditions is likely to depend on the specific circumstances. Whereas this seems highly
unlikely for consuming sugar or self-applying drugs, the case may be less clear for wheel running and
would need further investigation. Wants may also differ largely depending on context and between
individuals. Moreover, not all wants may be easily captured based on observable behaviour. Animals
may also strive for and value meta-stimuli such as increasing knowledge (find “truth”), having choice,
being able to learn, reaching a goal only after investing effort, managing what happens (“control”),
or choosing among the promotion and prevention of risks [37]. Nevertheless, we concur with Yeates [1]
that an attempt at tackling these sorts of questions is necessary. It is also worthwhile because with
every single attempt to address these questions, the species that is investigated will be slightly better
understood [10].
Though we very much doubt that an organism such as “lickens” can ever be produced due to the
complexity of the genetic basis of behavioural control mechanisms (and we agree that producing such
organisms would be highly questionable with respect to ethics [38,39]), they provide an interesting
thought experiment [1]. Lickens are genetically modified chickens that have no legs, beaks or feathers.
Whereas in Yeates view they are not natural because their behaviour deviates considerably from their
wild counterparts, the red jungle fowl, we can still ask whether these lickens behave according to what
is in-their-nature. From the ethologist’s point of view, whether these lickens could behave according to
their nature would depend on whether their behavioural control mechanisms were modified along
with their anatomy. If they no longer had motivations for “pecking, flying, dustbathing, or laying
eggs” they could be considered to behave according to their nature. If these motivations were still
present (the behavioural control mechanisms unchanged), lickens would present a species with the
most serious restriction imaginable in behaving according to their nature because they would have
motivations for behaviour that they cannot anatomically execute. This species would also illuminate
the difficulty in investigating their wants and likes. How could we find out about these wants and
likes when the actions required can no longer be performed? However, we may influence the ability to
perform a behaviour in farm animal species in much more subtle ways. For example, we may ask how
much we interfere with how cattle behave if they are de-horned (or genetically hornless) and we can
ask whether these cattle can still behave according to their nature (Box 2).
We fully agree with many of Yeates’ conclusions [1]. Specifically, the occurrence of unnatural
(abnormal) behaviour is likely to indicate a problem in the flexibility of behaviour control and is a
warning sign with respect to behaving in-ones-nature and therefore with respect to animal welfare.
However, even here the definition of unnatural behaviour may only be clear in extreme cases such as
highly repetitive (stereotypic) behaviour. A more subtle behaviour that has been considered unnatural
is cross-sucking in calves. Here, we can ask what goals need to be reachable for the calves such that
they do not cross-suck, which may indicate that they can more closely behave according what is
in-their-nature (Box 1). In any case, abnormal behaviour is also the result of a given behavioural
mechanism. In this sense, it reflects “natural” behaviour under the given (artificial housing) conditions.
Yet, with such a broad view of the term “natural”, all behaviour would need to be considered natural
and therefore, “naturalness” would become meaningless as an argument in the discussion of welfare.
Agriculture 2018, 8, 136 6 of 8
Box 2. De-horning cattle and goats.
Cattle (Bos taurus) belong to the taxon bovidae. The common trait of this taxon is a pair of postorbital horns.
Horns, in contrast to antlers, consist of a bony core and a keratinized sheath, and cannot be shed as male deer
do with the antlers. The ultimate functions of horns have been discussed by several authors (reviewed in [40]);
there is evidence for horns serving thermoregulation as well as visual communication. Here, we focus on visual
communication. Horns, as an “extension” of the head are likely to emphasise visual signals, e.g., threats that
may lead to displacements (Figure 2). In addition, bovid animals may learn that horns hurt and thus avoid
physical contact with a horned herd member. Since horned cows have been found to have larger individual
distances ([41]; but for goats see [42]) compared to hornless individuals, and to avoid injurious accidents both
between animals and with humans, most famers prefer keeping hornless cattle/goats. Disbudding or breeding
are options that lead to hornless bovids, both representing obvious interventions by humans. Despite the fact
that hornless animals do occur naturally in wild populations, this does not necessarily mean that these animals
are not impaired (inevitably, not all the individuals in a population have maximal fitness). From an ethical point
of view, one might prefer breeding genetically hornless subjects over disbudding calves or kids, since this a
painful procedure. Nevertheless, when we think of the licken example, one might ask whether it is justified to
breed away an organ that is part of the naturalness of a species/population. In contrast to a licken, a hornless
cow or goat is still able to perform all behaviours that it would perform with horns and may well be motivated to
do so. However, the goal of these behaviours might not be achieved as easily without horns, e.g., a subordinate
herd member would not retreat in response to a threat. Thus, agonistic interactions may be exaggerated, and
social hierarchy within a herd may become less stable [41]. Does this affect their emotional wellbeing? From an
ethologist’s perspective, we argue that the social behaviour of a hornless bovid might be “as it is in-its-nature”
as long as the subject can perform the behaviour it is motivated to (which is possible without horns), and the
goal can be achieved (i.e., individual distance is granted or access to a resource is given).
Figure 2. Horns emphasize visual display in cows. Adapted from [43], original courtesy of J. Probst.
It is more difficult to define how natural behaviour can be ensured. First, good health is the basis
for being able to behave and therefore for natural behaviour. Additionally, if animals can follow their
persistent or recurring wants and reach their goals, the integrity of their behaviour may be ensured in
a way that is in-their-nature. This may eventually ensure a basic amount of welfare.
3. Conclusions
Behaving in a way that corresponds to what is in an animal’s nature may be viewed as a
pre-requisite for good welfare comparable with an individual’s health. Natural behaviour in this
sense involves reaching adequate goal states for all persistent or recurring wants that arise in a given
environment. A full description of natural behaviour specifically in captivity is a convoluted long-term
project piecing together information of what animals want and like.
Agriculture 2018, 8, 136 7 of 8
Author Contributions: Writing-Original Draft Preparation, L.G., E.H.; Writing-Review & Editing, L.G., E.H.
Funding: We acknowledge support by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Open Access Publication
Fund of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Yeates, J. Naturalness and animal welfare. Animals 2018, 8, 53. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
2. Diogo, R. Evolution Driven by Organismal Behaviour—A Unifying View of Life, Function, Form, Mismatches, and
Trends; Springer International Publishing AG: Cham, Switzerland, 2017; pp. 1–252.
3. Budyansky, S. The Covenant of the Wild: Why Animals Chose Domestication; William Morrow and Co. Inc.:
New York, NY, USA, 1992.
4. Marshall, F.B.; Dobney, K.; Denham, T.; Capriles, J.M. Breeding and gene flow in animal domestication.
PNAS 2014, 111, 6153–6158. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
5. Geiger, M.; Sánchez-Villagra, M.R.; Lindholm, A.K. A longitudinal study of phenotypic changes in early
domestication of house mice. R. Soc. Open Sci. 2018, 5, 172099. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
6. Tinbergen, N. On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschr. Tierpsychol. 1963, 20, 410–433. [CrossRef]
7. Bateson, P.; Laland, K.N. Tinbergen’s four questions: An appreciation and an update. TREE 2013, 28, 712–718.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
8. Dawkins, M.S. Tribute to Tinbergen: Questions and how to answer them. Ethology 2014, 120, 120–122. [CrossRef]
9. Gygax, L. Wanting, liking and welfare: The role of affective states in proximate control of behaviour in
vertebrates. Ethology 2017, 123, 689–704. [CrossRef]
10. Wechsler, B. Normal behaviour as a basis for animal welfare assessment. Anim. Welf. 2007, 16, 107–110.
11. Špinka, M. How important is natural behaviour in animal farming systems? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2006,
100, 117–128. [CrossRef]
12. Price, E.O. Behavioural genetics and the process of animal domestication. In Genetics and the Behaviour of
Domestic Animals; Grandin, T., Ed.; Academic Press: San Diego, CA, USA, 1997; pp. 31–65.
13. Jensen, P. Observations on the maternal-behaviour of free-ranging domestic pigs. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 1986, 16,
131–142. [CrossRef]
14. Stolba, A.; Woodgush, D.G.M. The behavior of pigs in a semi-natural environment. Anim. Prod. 1989, 48, 419–425.
[CrossRef]
15. Woodgush, D.G.M.; Jensen, P.; Algers, B. Behavior of pigs in a novel seminatural environment. Biol. Behav.
1990, 15, 62–73.
16. Jensen, P.; Vestergaard, K.; Algers, B. Nestbuilding in free-ranging domestic sows. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 1993, 38,
245–255. [CrossRef]
17. Hall, S.J.G. Chillingham cattle: Dominance and affinities and access to supplementary food. Ethology 1986,
71, 201–215. [CrossRef]
18. Lazo, A. Social segregation and the maintenance of social stability in a feral cattle population. Anim. Behav.
1994, 48, 1133–1141. [CrossRef]
19. Duncan, I.J.H.; Savory, C.J.; Wood-Gush, D.G.M. Observations on the reproductive behaviour of domestic
fowl in the wild. Appl. Anim. Ethol. 1978, 4, 29–42. [CrossRef]
20. Boissy, A.; Manteuffel, G.; Jensen, M.B.; Oppermann Moe, R.; Spruijt, B.; Keeling, L.J.; Winckler, C.;
Forkman, B.; Dimitrov, I.; Langbein, J.; et al. Assessment of positive emotions in animals to improve
their welfare. Phys. Behav. 2007, 92, 375–397. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
21. Mendl, M.; Burman, O.H.P.; Paul, E.S. An integrative and functional framework for the study of animal
emotion and mood. Proc. R. Soc. B 2010, 277, 2895–2904. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
22. Paul, E.S.; Mendl, M.T. Animal emotion: Descriptive and prescriptive definitions and their implications for a
comparative perspective. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2018, 205, 202–209. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
23. Andersen, H.M.-L.; Pedersen, L.J. The effect of feed trough position on choice of defecation area in farrowing
pens by loose sows. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2011, 131, 48–52. [CrossRef]
Agriculture 2018, 8, 136 8 of 8
24. Wang, Y.; Li, D.P.; Shen, X.; Shi, Z.X. Effects of inductive methods on dunging behavior of weaning pigs in
slatted floor pens. Int. J. Agric. Biol. Eng. 2016, 9, 192–198.
25. Ocepek, M.; Goold, C.M.; Busancˇic´, M.; Aarnink, A.J.A. Drinker position influences the cleanness of the
lying area of pigs in a welfare-friendly housing facility. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2018, 198, 44–51. [CrossRef]
26. Arey, D.S. Straw and food as reinforcers for prepartal sows. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 1992, 33, 217–226. [CrossRef]
27. Hillmann, E.; Johns, J.; Wagner, K.; Waiblinger, S.; Barth, K. Saugverhalten und Festfutteraufnahme
muttergebunden aufgezogener Kälber. Anim. Nutri. 2011, 34, 115–117.
28. Uys, J.L.; Lourens, D.C.; Thompson, P.N. The effect of unrestricted milk feeding on the growth and health of
Jersey calves. J. S. Afr. Vet. Assoc. 2011, 82, 47–52. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
29. De Passillé, A.M.; Borderas, F.; Rushen, J. Cross-sucking by dairy calves may become a habit or reflect
characteristics of individual calves more than milk allowance or weaning. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2011, 133,
137–143. [CrossRef]
30. Roth, B.A.; Barth, K.; Gygax, L.; Hillmann, E. Influence of artificial vs. mother-bonded rearing on sucking
behaviour, health and weight gain in calves. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2009, 119, 143–150. [CrossRef]
31. Lidfors, L.M.; Jung, J.; de Passille, A.M. Changes in suckling behaviour of dairy calves nursed by their dam
during the first month post partum. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2010, 128, 23–29. [CrossRef]
32. Margerison, J.K.; Preston, T.R.; Berry, N.; Philipps, C.J.C. Cross-sucking and other oral behaviours in calves,
and their relation to cow suckling and food provision. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2003, 80, 277–286. [CrossRef]
33. Rzezniczek, M.; Gygax, L.; Wechsler, B.; Weber, R. Comparison of the behaviour of piglets raised in an
artificial rearing system or reared by the sow. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2015, 165, 57–65. [CrossRef]
34. Frei, D.; Würbel, H.; Wechsler, B.; Gygax, L.; Burla, J.B.; Weber, R. Can body nosing in artificially reared
piglets be reduced by sucking and massaging dummies? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2018, 202, 20–27. [CrossRef]
35. Jensen, P.; Toates, F.M. Who needs behavioral needs? Motivation aspects of the needs of animals. Appl. Anim.
Behav. Sci. 1993, 37, 161–181. [CrossRef]
36. Franks, B. What do animals want? Anim. Welf. 2018, in press.
37. Cornwell, J.F.M.; Franks, B.; Higgins, E.T. Truth, control, and value motivations: The “what”, “how”, and
“why” of approach and avoidance. Front. Syst. Neurosci. 2014, 8, 194. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
38. Schmidt, K. Integrität und genetische Veränderung von Nutztieren. J. Verbraucherschutz Lebensmittelsicherheit
2009, 4, 399–406. [CrossRef]
39. Sandøe, P.; Hocking, P.M.; Forkman, B.; Haldane, K.; Kristensen, H.H.; Palmer, C. The blind hens’ challenge:
Does it undermine the view that only welfare matters in our dealings with animals? Environ. Values 2014, 23,
727–742. [CrossRef]
40. Kiltie, R.A. Evolution and function of horns and hornlike organs in female ungulates. Biol. J. Linn. Soc. 1985, 24,
299–320. [CrossRef]
41. Knierim, U.; Irrgang, N.; Roth, B.A. To be or not to be horned—Consequences in cattle. Livest. Sci. 2015, 179,
29–37. [CrossRef]
42. Aschwanden, J.; Gygax, L.; Wechsler, B.; Keil, N.M. Social distances of goats at the feeding rack: Influence of the
quality of social bonds, rank differences, grouping age and presence of horns. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci. 2008, 114,
116–131. [CrossRef]
43. Probst, J. Spengler Neff Erfolgreiches Rinderhandling; Forschungsinstitut für biologischen Landbau FiBL: Frick,
Switzerland, 2014; pp. 1–28.
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
